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Abstract
Background: The ways in which the public understands nuclear waste affect nuclear waste policy and the actual
disposal of nuclear waste. This paper traces the origins and the evolution of the public understanding of nuclear
waste through an analysis of a sample of the historical record of the public discourse on the topic.
Methods: This paper employs sociocultural anthropology methods innovatively: rather than emphasizing the data
collection aspect of participant observation, it emphasizes interpretive discourse analysis, sampling the archives of
the New York Times as a de facto ethnographic repository of the U.S. discourse on nuclear waste spanning the years
1945–1969.
Results: Whereas no evidence of a public concept for nuclear waste is found in the chronologically first item of
this study’s dataset, the chronologically last item implies a public conceptualization of nuclear waste that appears
not too different from the one encountered today.
Conclusions: The paper illuminates especially the evolution of two key threads of environmental consciousness in
the U.S. public discourse: as waste grew ever more harmful in the public understanding, the space available for
disposing of it shrank and eventually disappeared.
Keywords: Nuclear waste disposal, Public discourse, Radioactive contamination, Environmental consciousness,
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“[S]ome kind of national burying place will be needed....
It has been proposed … to cast the atomic waste coffins
in heavy concrete and lower them into one of the great
deeps of the ocean or shoot them off the earth in a
rocket that would become a satellite in outer space” [1].
Background
The problem of nuclear waste disposal
“America’s nuclear waste management program is at an
impasse” states the 2012 report submitted to the U.S.
Secretary of Energy by the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America’s Nuclear Future1. Indeed, over 165 million
pounds of high-level radioactive waste wait for perman-
ent disposal in the U.S.; most is spent nuclear fuel from
the energy industry2, and the rest originates from legacy
national defense activities and from the navy3. While
decay requires tens of thousands of years4, the tempor-
ary arrangements under which the bulk of this inven-
tory is currently stored, at hundreds of locations
dispersed throughout the U.S.5, were not designed for
permanent storage and are not deemed safe for the
permanent storage of high-level nuclear waste6. Yet
radioactive waste has been accumulating there ever
since the nuclear energy industry took off in the 1950s
and then grew in the 1960s. Some of the high-level nu-
clear waste currently under temporary storage dates as
far back as the Second World War.
The last event of major significance in a decadelong and
conflict-ridden journey towards a permanent disposal
solution to the nation’s nuclear waste problem was the
halting of work on the targeted site at Yucca Mountain in
Nevada in 2008. The Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC)
characterized this as “the latest indicator of a [nuclear
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waste management] policy that has been troubled for de-
cades and has now all but completely broken down” [2].
There is little dispute that the key reason underlying
nuclear waste’s unfolding complex story of “controversy,
litigation, and protracted delay” lies with grave public
concerns over “adequate protection of public health and
safety and the environment” [2]. The BRC assesses that
“finding sites where all affected […] are willing to support
or at least accept a [permanent nuclear waste storage] fa-
cility has proved exceptionally difficult” [2]. Put in other
words, the U.S. public, in virtual unanimity, views nuclear
waste as hazardous to human health and to the natural
environment and does not deem safe any of the known
methods for disposing of it.
Yet inability to reach agreement about a site of perman-
ent disposal does not make nuclear waste disappear. In
fact, the U.S. inventory of nuclear waste continues to
grow: some four to five million pounds of high-level radio-
active waste are generated by the nuclear energy industry
annually7. Piling up nuclear waste in temporary storage fa-
cilities poses as great, if not greater, threats to the natural
environment, to public health, and to national security as
does disposing of such waste under permanent arrange-
ments. In addition, the current impasse threatens the via-
bility of a significant source of energy, making visible one
aspect of the complex body of obstacles that the develop-
ment of non-carbon sources of energy needs to overcome:
at present, nuclear power supplies around one fifth of the
electricity in the U.S.; with the caveats of solving accident
vulnerability and waste disposal issues, nuclear energy
may represent an alternative to the continuing global rise
in carbon emissions.
The public conceptualization of nuclear waste
At present, the opposition to hosting a nuclear disposal
site usually appears to be considered a given. Yet a range
of explanations coexist as to the origins of the public
conceptualization of nuclear waste8.
One common and seemingly commonsensical sugges-
tion is that today’s public concerns over the safety of nu-
clear waste disposal started with the popular political
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. These movements
have been historically well documented [3] and continue
to draw significant scholarly interest into the present [4,
5]. At the same time, they are also generally viewed as
springing out of certain remarkable deeds of some re-
markable individuals. The biologist and social critic Rachel
Carson, for example, is often credited with having “laid
the foundation for the modern environmental movement”
[6]. “Senator Gaylord Nelson created Earth Day as a way
to force this issue onto the national agenda,” reads a page
from the website of the Environmental Protection Agency;
“Twenty million Americans demonstrated in different U.S.
cities, and it worked!” [7].
Another line of argument specifically relates the
American public’s negative perception of all things nu-
clear to the history of nuclear weapons [8], including
weapons testing9. This view focuses on the devastating
aftermath of nuclear explosions as well as, in addition,
on a series of visible individual accidents such as the
most recent meltdown at Fukushima, Japan in the year
2011 [9].
In yet another portrayal, the cultural origins of “nu-
clear fear” may be rooted more profoundly in our shared
myths if not even human consciousness. It is some kind
of deep mythical fear, in other words, that is then stoked
by both the imagery of nuclear warfare and the visibility
of nuclear energy disasters such as the recent Fukushima
meltdown or Chernobyl and Three Mile Island before it
[10, 11].
Given that the public conceptualization of nuclear
waste underlies the political impasse that in effect per-
petuates the storage of radioactive waste under tem-
porary arrangements and threatens the viability as well
as future of a significant energy source, it may be in-
structive to inquire into it more closely. Where does
the public conceptualization of nuclear waste really
come from?
Nuclear waste in public discourse
To understand the public conceptualization of nuclear
waste, this paper takes the route of empirical investiga-
tion, while recognizing that a number of routes are pos-
sible and promising10. It adapts key methodological tools
from sociocultural anthropology to produce a sample of
the records of the U.S. public discourse on nuclear waste
and then subjects that sample of records to interpretive
discourse analysis.
The records in the dataset produced for the study span
the years 1945–1969, the timeframe corresponding to
what this researcher earlier identified as the first wave of
public discourse on nuclear waste11. The core reason for
limiting the investigation to this timeframe has to do
with the emergence and the shaping of the notion of nu-
clear waste in public discourse. Regarding starting at
1945, as discussed in the researcher’s earlier study, there
is no evidence of a notion of nuclear or atomic or radio-
active waste in the public discourse prior to that year.
Regarding the 1969 cutoff, the researcher’s earlier study
also indicated that, by the time President Nixon took of-
fice in early 1969, the concept of nuclear waste in the
public discourse had already assumed the familiar shape
in which it is encountered today: the second wave of
public discourse characterized nuclear waste primarily in
terms of its threats, dissociated from the benefits of nu-
clear exploitation, and as carrying risks that cannot be
eliminated.
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Methods
Designing an anthropological lens to look at public
discourse on nuclear waste
To trace the evolution of the environmental conscious-
ness on nuclear waste in the U.S., this paper employs
the research and analytical methods of sociocultural an-
thropology. The methodology is fitting to the task for
anthropologists have honed their research to the very
aims of mapping out and understanding what at various
points in the discipline’s history has been seen as cul-
tural structure, grammar of culture, cultural meaning,
or simply culture.
Yet it is not possible to conventionally employ the
ethnographic toolkit for meaningfully studying the envir-
onmental consciousness on nuclear waste in the U.S.
The key reason lies with the method of participant ob-
servation, which within the discipline of sociocultural
anthropology is widely considered to be the vital core of
ethnographic research. In its conventional application,
ethnographic participant observation requires the re-
searcher personally to take part, indeed to immerse her
own self, in most facets of human activity in the setting
that she investigates. But a researcher cannot travel back
in time to the U.S. of the years 1945–1969 when the en-
vironmental consciousness regarding nuclear waste took
shape. Neither can a researcher personally participate in
the range of human activities that take place in a setting
the size of the U.S., at least not in the same way that she
can participate in the lives of the people on a small
island.
The methodology of ethnographic participant observa-
tion was originally developed for making sense of cultures
that appeared rather entirely alien when encountered by
the West, cultures of peoples not known to “us,” cultures
“without history,” or, in better words, cultures that were
encountered in the absence of a written record of docu-
mentation recognizable in the West [12]. Indeed, many an
ethnographic project traditionally started with the re-
searcher’s learning of a native tongue. In contrast, this
study’s object of focus is far from alien and has been
extensively documented. An abundance of textual and
audio-visual records of what was said about nuclear waste
disposal in the U.S. between 1945 and 1969 can be found
across numerous physical libraries, archives, and elec-
tronic databases: news reporting and commentaries across
a range of media outlets, as well as innumerable govern-
mental reports and scholarly studies, not to mention
popular literature across different nonfictional and fic-
tional genres as well as works of visual art and moving
pictures.
In order to design an anthropological lens that could
be useful for looking at the evolution of environmental
consciousness on nuclear waste in the U.S., this re-
searcher interpreted the core of ethnographic participant
observation to lie not with personal immersion in the
life of a community bound to a physical setting but ra-
ther with the method’s blending of rigorous empirical
observation with a shifting of perspective from the ob-
server to the subject of observation. Instead of empha-
sizing the convention of the data collection aspect of the
participant observation method, the anthropological lens
re-designed in this way focuses on identifying and sam-
pling data that represent an equivalent to traditional
ethnographic fieldnotes.
Such re-design yields the additional benefit of improv-
ing the scope of data under investigation. The emphasis
that conventional anthropological research places on a
researcher’s personal immersion in fieldwork and on a
holistic approach to observation clearly aims at broaden-
ing the body of empirical observations. In furtherance of
the same direction, the painstaking documentation of
the researcher’s holistic observations in fieldnotes aims
to produce as extensive a record of data for subsequent
analysis and interpretation as possible. Nevertheless, the
researcher’s personal participation in the collection of
data necessarily limits the scope of such data strictly to
what one individual can produce within exacting frames
of time. Even in the best of implementations of partici-
pant observation, the voluminous fieldnotes and records
produced through ethnographic research represent nar-
rowly limited data samples.
In contrast, this study’s empirical focus, the body of the
environmental discourse on nuclear waste in the U.S.,
challenges the researcher not with the production of ever
more data. Rather, the challenge is how to sample the
multiple and rich sources of records in a way that the
dataset produced, while representative, and while holistic
in scope so that potentially significant findings are not
hindered by exclusion of potentially significant variables
from the start, would also meaningfully lend itself to
qualitative analysis and in-depth interpretation in the best
of the anthropological tradition.
Sampling environmental discourse in the archive of the
New York Times
The challenge was resolved with identification of the arch-
ive of the New York Times as the source for sampling the
environmental discourse on nuclear waste between the
years 1945 and 1969.
Given this timeframe, a newspaper archive is an espe-
cially appropriate source from which to draw a dataset
that would address a question such as where the concept
of nuclear waste disposal comes from. Arguably, the ex-
tent to which newspapers reflect the public discourse
and influence the public discourse is commensurate with
at least the extent to which their physical printed copies
reach into the hands of readers12. This study’s timeframe
appears to have also been the heyday of newspapers in
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America: their circulation grew steadily after the Second
World War and it was not until the 1970s that news-
paper circulation fell below the number of U.S. house-
holds [13, 14].
Among the large body of U.S. media outlets, the New
York Times stands out for its sizable national circulation
as well as for its editorial ambitions of covering “All the
News That’s Fit to Print.” During the timeframe that is
the focus of this study, the pages of the New York Times
recorded the voices of a great number of individuals: not
only reporters and editors but also readers whose pub-
lished addresses and feedback to the newspaper regard-
ing what they read in its pages and what they perceived
to happen in the world around them, though editorially
controlled, represent a sampling of voices from a sub-
stantial pool. So the New York Times is best positioned
also for serving as a proxy for the knowledgeable and
articulate individual that conventional ethnographic re-
search designates as “key informant”. Throughout the
years under investigation, the New York Times pursued
the role of the nation’s “newspaper of record,” and, argu-
ably, it accordingly influenced numerous other media or-
ganizations throughout the nation. This special standing
is highlighted by a fact of symbolic pertinence to this
study: it was a reporter of the New York Times, William
L. Laurence, who the U.S. government drafted in 1945
to write the official history of the atomic bomb project.
Regarding the technical aspects of sample selection,
the records that constitute the dataset used for the ana-
lyses and interpretations outlined in the following pages
were drawn from the electronic archives of the New
York Times through keyword searches: they were se-
lected for containing in their headings and/or subhead-
ings one of the keywords “atomic,” “radioactive,” or
“nuclear” in combination with the keyword “waste,” and
they were all published between the years 1945 and
196913. The electronic archives characterize these items
as “articles,” “front page articles,” “editorials,” and “let-
ters to the editor.”
The dataset contains 73 records in total14. Placed in a
historical chronology, 17 of these items correspond to
the presidency of Harry Truman, 1945–1953; 44 to the
presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, 1953–1961; 6 to the
presidency of John F. Kennedy, 1961–1963; and 6 to the
presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1969. There is
some significance to the fact that the vast majority of
these records correspond to the Eisenhower presidency:
while President Truman and President Eisenhower each
served the same amount of time in office, the New York
Times published well over twice as many items fitting
this study’s sampling criteria during the Eisenhower
presidency. The rate of publication for such items then
fell under President Kennedy and all but disappeared
under President Johnson.
Interpretive discourse analysis
The findings outlined in the following pages were reached
through subjecting this dataset to what may be called in-
terpretive discourse analysis. Given the researcher’s prior
work with these discourse records as part of a larger data-
set11, the present analysis represents a re-visitation of the
data that focused specifically on addressing the question
of the conceptualization of nuclear waste. Specifically, the
researcher freshly read each one of the items in the data-
set, with which she was already familiar from previous
readings and analyses, now literally to answer the ques-
tion: How is nuclear waste conceptualized in this item?
The answer to that question could be a direct quotation
from the item, a paraphrase, or a verbalization of what ap-
peared to be implied in specific discourse segments in the
item. The last, an interpretation, counts for how the re-
searcher most typically answered the research question at
the conclusion of such re-reading of a dataset item. Often-
times, the answer reached after visiting a record, or a ten-
tative articulation of a finding, prompted yet another
visitation of a previously visited record or even pool of
records. The goal of such repeated interpretation was to
unearth the meanings that underlay the literal level of dis-
course in a given record and that also permeated the lar-
ger sample of records. Focusing on the underlying shared
meanings would have also helped counter for biases that
would arguably be present in records that were editorially
pre-selected. This analysis was less interested in the literal
level of discursive statements possibly influenced by “for”
or “against” editorial and/or political positions, and rather
more interested in teasing out the shared underlying un-
derstandings that, regardless of the political position an in-
dividual had assumed or would eventually assume, defined
the very topic of nuclear waste in the public discourse of
the time under investigation. The quotations and illustra-
tions in the following section are not exhaustive; other
segments could be cited, and the entire dataset is available
from the author upon request.
Results
A significant finding of this research concerns the evo-
lution of the public conceptualization of nuclear waste
during 1945–1969. Whereas no evidence of a public
concept for nuclear waste is found in the chronologic-
ally first item of this study’s dataset, the chronologically
last item implies a public conceptualization of nuclear
waste that appears not too different from the one en-
countered today. The interpretive analysis of the items
in the study’s sample identified four key conceptual
stages in this evolution: in the first stage, nuclear waste
was introduced to public discourse in a tentative defin-
ition; in the second, public discourse agnostically assessed
nuclear waste; during the third stage, a view of nuclear
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waste crystallized; by the fourth, nuclear waste appeared
to be resolutely defined.
An additional significant finding is that this process
was shaped largely by the mutual evolution of two con-
ceptual threads. The first is the hazard perspective: over
the course of the years under investigation, nuclear
waste was framed in the public discourse in terms of
danger—increasingly and with increasing certainty. The
second thread is the vanishing of physical space for safe
disposal: as nuclear waste was ever more markedly
understood in terms of threat to human health and to
the natural environment, the space available for dispos-
ing of it came to be conceptualized as ever more limited
and remote—until it eventually disappeared.
The following paragraphs periodize the evolution that
brought the public conceptualization of nuclear waste
into the shape in which it is encountered at present and
also highlight some of the terms in which the hazard
definition of nuclear waste and the shrinking of disposal
space for it were articulated, in tandem, as they evolved.
Discussion
Periodizing the evolution of the public conceptualization
of nuclear waste
Plotting the distribution of dataset items by year of pub-
lication reveals an approximate correspondence between
the stages of conceptual evolution named above and the
annual rates at which the sampled records of the public
discourse on nuclear waste made the pages of the New
York Times. Interestingly, at least three of the four stages
through which the public conceptualization of nuclear
waste evolved appear to correspond to nearly normal
distributions with clear peaks. The first stage, which
started in the year 1948 and continued through the year
1951, saw the peak in the rate of publication of items
that fit the sampling criteria of this study sometime be-
tween the years 1949 and 1950. The records interpreted
here as indicative of the second stage of evolution of
public discourse on nuclear waste were published in the
New York Times between the years 1953 and 1956; the
rate of their publication peaked in the year 1955. The
third stage, which can be placed within the years 1958
and 1963, reached the peak of publications in 1959. It
may be slightly a stretch to view the years 1966 and
1967 as the flat peak of the period 1964–1969; more ap-
propriately, the fourth stage of evolution may be viewed
as corresponding in the distribution chart not to a curve
but rather to a flat without a peak: indeed, the fourth
stage represents the end of the evolution of the public
concept of nuclear waste.
The entire sample’s pinnacle of publication rate, reached
in the year 1957, lends itself to two complementary views.
In the first, the year 1957 marks the transition from the
second to the third stage of conceptual evolution: the
interpretive analysis reveals that it was essentially in this
year that the public discourse re-oriented its focus from
the earnest assessment of the potential dangers of nuclear
waste to crystallizing the notion of nuclear waste as irre-
deemably dangerous. Complementing this watershed view,
1957 may also be seen as the peak of the 11-year time-
frame 1952–1963, a longer stage of conceptual evolution,
in this complementary view, that started with an agnostic
assessment of nuclear waste and concluded with a
crystallization of the public view of nuclear waste as irre-
deemably a threat.
1945, before nuclear waste
The first time that the notion of waste appears in prox-
imity to the notion of atomic reaction in this dataset is
in the remarkable firsthand account of the bombing of
Nagasaki in 1945. William L. Laurence, the only reporter
to be part of the military mission on August 9, subtitled
his September 9 piece “A City Laid Waste by World’s
Most Destructive Force.” The waste of nuclear, in other
words, was the devastation that followed the explosion
of the bomb. Deploying the “World’s Most Destructive
Force” had to do with putting an end to war. So the
bomb was to be admired: “It is a thing of beauty to
behold, this ‘gadget.’ It its design went millions of man-
hours of what is without doubt the most concentrated
intellectual effort in history.” Clearly, as of 1945, public
discourse must not yet have indexed the connotations of
nuclear that dominate public discourse today.
Stage one, tentative definitions
To the extent that the historical archive of the New York
Times may serve as a proxy for a chronological record,
“atomic waste” in the sense of “waste materials from
atomic energy plants” was formally introduced to the
U.S. public discourse on April 15, 1948. As discussed in
this researcher’s earlier study, this was the era of the sci-
ence and technology paradigm of public discourse on
nuclear waste11. Covering an expert conference session
on “the peace-time problems of the disposal of radio-
active waste” qualified as “the first on that subject ever
incorporated in a general safety meeting,” the report
quotes government technocrats arguing for this “serious
hazard of the future” to “be put on the same agenda with
problems of hotel and restaurant safety, traffic, fire pre-
vention and home accidents.” Some effort, in other
words, appears to have been deemed necessary to draw
proper attention to the topic of atomic waste. But the
war was over and peacetime was entitled to attend to its
own challenges. The headline of the quoted record
speaks of “safety menace” and further on the record re-
lates that even though “sufficient dilution of some radio-
isotopes in water renders them presently harmless, it is
questionable whether radioactive wastes can be made
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safe for disposal in a drainage system in the ocean
merely by aqueous dilution.”
Remarkably, the records from the years 1948 through
1951 indicate that the most significant terms in which
nuclear waste would eventually come to be defined and
is presently understood were introduced into the public
discourse already in this first stage: the key notion of a
potential hazard that is difficult for humans to sense yet
may constitute a safety concern; the recognition that
gradations in the level of radioactivity would correspond
to gradations in the threat that radioactivity poses to hu-
man health; the notion that certain methods of disposal
and certain places of disposal may amplify or mitigate
that threat as well as carry different costs. Even the idea
of one single national disposal site was already introduced
in this stage. Titled “Atomic ‘Cemetery’ Needed for
Waste,” a report from July 29, 1950 argues that “some
kind of national burying place will be needed for the lethal
substances;” this would be superior to disposing of nuclear
waste by dumping it in the ocean, conditional on a plaus-
ible scenario: “[i]f fish ate the material, scientists fear it
might find its way into food used by humans.” Clearly, a
route for radioactive materials to enter the human food
supply was already thought about.
Yet nuclear waste as well as the threats associated with
it appear to have felt distant and abstract upon their initial
introduction into public discourse—especially so when
compared to how they would come to be articulated in
the later stages through which the concept of nuclear
waste evolved into the current public definition. At this
first stage, the threat of nuclear waste was located persist-
ently in a loosely specified future. For example, a report
from February 13, 1949 that refers to information issued
by the Atomic Energy Commission regarding land burial
in containers comments that, though such disposal “may
be good enough for the present,” “the time will surely
come when atomic power plants will be generating electri-
city and when it will be necessary to get rid of their radio-
active wastes in a less cumbersome way.”
“Cumbersome” is also a telling word: often in this first
stage, the threat of nuclear waste seemed to be viewed
as minor and dismissible; there was no dispute to the as-
sumption that proper scientific and technological effort
would make it disappear. Titled “Atomic Waste Dumped
in Sea,” a brief report of May 22, 1949 quotes the British
Ministry of Supply at face value in explaining that nu-
clear waste dumped into sea was “only slightly radio-
active and the amount too small ‘to have any harmful
effect on fish or on human life.’” On September 9, 1950,
reporting on the success of laboratory experimenting
that “may be a solution to the problem of getting rid of
radioactive wastes from atomic research laboratories,” a
report optimistically titled “New Method Handles Radio-
active Waste” concludes that “it is believed that [the
experiments] would be applicable to larger plants, which
might handle thousands of gallons of wastes daily.” Better
yet, a report from February 11, 1951 declares, in its title
already, that “Dangerous Radioactive Wastes, Which
Now Are Buried, May Have Many Industrial Uses.” Of
those “many” envisioned uses, the record specifies “the
sterilization of food and pharmaceuticals.”
Importantly, during this first stage of the evolution of
the concept of nuclear waste in the public discourse, the
space available for disposing of nuclear waste was envi-
sioned as virtually unlimited. This is how a brief report
of August 7, 1950 describes disposal at the Brookhaven
National Laboratory in Long Island: “radioactive material
[…] is collected in small tanks after it goes into the
drains. If it ‘cools off,’ it goes on into sewers. Any acci-
dental seepage […] can be detected quickly […] Gas used
to cool off the atomic pile is highly diluted before being
released into the air.” The water, the ground, and the air,
indeed all of the planet must have been assumed to
cache disposal possibilities.
All in all, as of 1951 nuclear waste was, in the words
of two reports published that month, “a nuisance.” And
any of the multiple themes through which that nuisance
was introduced into the public discourse seemed just as
likely as any of the others eventually to dominate how
public discourse would define nuclear waste: nuclear
waste could turn out to become a matter primarily of
threat and of danger just as much as it could turn out to
become a matter of industrial cost efficiency just as
much as it could turn out to become a matter of tri-
umph of the scientific and technological effort over the
wonders of the (manipulated) natural world.
Stage two, focal points emerge
Theme wise, the records from the year 1953 through the
year 1956 have a mode: 6 out of the 14 touch on the
theme of putting nuclear waste to one or another benefi-
cial use. A triumphant headline of January 27, 1954, for
example, announced that “Electricity Is Made From
Atomic Waste.” Penned by none other than the famed
William L. Laurence, the report detailed at some length
the technical backend of “[a]n atomic battery that con-
verts atomic energy directly and simply into small but
usable quantities of electrical energy.” It was a genuine
technological achievement, “[t]his direct conversion for
the first time in history of nuclear energy into electri-
city.” To relate its significance, Laurence quotes David
Sarnoff, head of the Radio Corporation of America and
one of the most prominent industry figures of the time,
to say that the technology underlying the prototype bat-
tery “may prove to be as significant as Edison’s conver-
sion of electricity into light.” That the generation of
electricity might have been among the most prominent
of the potential uses of nuclear waste that were being
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pursued is supported by a brief record from May 18, 1955.
Reporting on “a young Swiss student,” just “18 years old,”
who had “designed a tiny self-powered electronic tube”
that “would use built-in radioactive material from the
atomic trash pile,” the record noted that the achievement
had won the student various prestigious accolades and
concluded that it would eventually “assur[e] him a top
college scholarship.”
But electricity was not the only potential use that was
envisioned for nuclear waste. Turning on its head, the
potential military threat that the nuclear waste was
sometimes seen to constitute, a record from May 20,
1954 entertained the idea that “the radioactive by-
products of atomic fission […] have a potential military
utility”: they could be used to create “a lethal radioactive
‘line’ along a frontier, behind a river, across a peninsula,
that would deny an area to the enemy.” So it was with
regret for the report to note that radioactive wastes were
“too small in quantity today to irradiate anything but a
small area.” And it was with hope to conclude that “a
large industrial complex dependent upon commercial
atomic power would add daily significant amounts of
radioactive waste products to the Nation’s chemical
armory.”
The entertainment of scenarios such as a radioactive
Maginot line, as well as the numerous technological
pursuits of potential uses for nuclear waste, seems to
have been manifestations of an overall effort to deny
nuclear waste an existence as waste. That theme was
articulated pithily in a record from May 8, 1956. Titled
“Atomic Waste No Problem Yet, Strauss Says at Gener-
ator Site,” the report cited the head of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission while he, together with his British
homologue, toured “this country’s first full-scale atomic
power project”: Lewis L. “Strauss said the term ‘atomic
waste’ is a misnomer”.
Importantly, denying nuclear waste an existence as
waste was not denial of the harms and hazards of radio-
activity15. On the contrary, the sample indicates that the
danger presented by nuclear waste was submitted to pub-
lic comprehension. For example, readers learned that,
while the amount of nuclear waste in existence was rela-
tively small, the anticipated expansion of the nuclear
energy industry would expand it in the future.
Significantly, scientific delimitations of danger were
given prominent attention. In a brief science note of
June 26, 1955, an oceanographer opposed the dumping
of nuclear waste in the ocean; the argument was that,
over time, such practice “would have an unpredictable
influence on the whole biological cycle of the sea.”
Some months later, on December 17, a substantive rec-
ord spoke of scientific consensus on the point that
“dispersal to the ocean cannot be the ultimate answer
to radioactive waste disposal,” on the grounds that,
assuming dumping over five decades, “a highly radio-
active form of strontium, known as Strontium 90,
would be enough to contaminate 5 percent of the en-
tire ocean volume.” Readers were also to learn that
“[i]n the body, strontium behaves much like calcium,
with a specific affinity for bone, and is quite effective
in producing bone cancer.”
The key reference of the scientific delimitation of
danger would indeed become human health. The sec-
ond stage’s most stern warning on “the biological ef-
fects of radiation” came on June 17, 1956. It was
launched with the epic remark that “mankind must
make up its mind whether a world movement for the
control of atomic energy is to be organized or whether
the human race must be slowly extinguished centuries
hence.” Singling out the “genetic dangers” posed by the
radioactive byproducts of the energy industry, the rec-
ord visualized “the perils that attend the peaceful uses
of atomic energy” with “a four-leafed clover” and “a
two-headed calf” and commented that a “legless animal
has no chance of survival in the wilderness.”
Such strong visual language notwithstanding, it would
be incorrect to conclude that the second stage of evolu-
tion of the notion of nuclear waste in the public dis-
course concluded with a firm definition of nuclear
waste as an irredeemable hazard. Indeed, a mere fort-
night after the publication of the report quoted above,
on July 1, 1956, one of the science notes carrying the
initials of the very author of that article now reported
on an achievement “in disposing safely of radioactive
waste”. But it is significant that, in this second stage,
public discourse came to delimit the danger of radio-
active waste in terms of science and with reference to
human health.
It is also significant that the scientific consensus that
had developed against ocean dumping put a crucial
limitation to the space that, up until that point, was as-
sumed available for the disposal of nuclear waste. No
longer was there a public understanding of the planet
as rife with possibilities for the disposal; the ocean was
no longer to be used. Within less than 3 months from
the first reporting of the oceanographer’s argument
against dumping came a revisitation of one earlier
dumping report. Whereas on January 19, the New York
Times had commented regarding the British dumping
of 1500 tons of radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean
that “[e]laborate precautions were taken to assure that
the waste containers do not disintegrate until their
contents have become harmless,” on September 18
readers were reminded of “the consignment of 1,500
tons that was dropped into the sea last January” and
were now to learn that “during the operation one con-
tainer fell from a derrick with the result that the outer
concrete casing broke.”
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1957, shifting from seeking solutions to seeking
protection
This study’s sample indicates that 1957 must have been
a crucial year in the evolution of the notion of nuclear
waste in the public discourse. That nuclear waste must
have drawn intense interest is suggested even by the fre-
quency of the coverage of the topic in the New York
Times, the highest of the years 1945 through 1969. In-
deed, revisiting the nuclear waste topic was common in
1957. For example, the inauguration of a research la-
boratory at a commercial petroleum company in Illinois
that would “put to work” radioactive waste originated
some 1500 miles away “from an atomic reactor in Idaho”
was the theme of two consecutive records, on April 10
and April 14, 1957. Or, the conclusions of a report of
the National Academy of Sciences regarding the safety
of disposal procedures received coverage on May 1 and
then again on May 5, 1957. Then in July, one case of
dumping in the vicinities of New York City prompted
three separate sampled records.
The three records of July 1957 also throw light on the
shifting of focus that marks 1957 as the year in which
public discourse moved from articulating nuclear waste
in terms of multiple searches for utilization solutions to
articulating it in terms of a pragmatic pursuit of protec-
tion from danger. On July 13, a brief record informed
the readers that “a tanker carrying a load of radioactive
sodium waste down the Hudson River en route to a
dumping point 150 miles southeast of New York” was
“expected to pass under the George Washington Bridge
[on that same day of the reporting] and reach the Battery
early at about noon.” Nothing had yet happened, in other
words, yet the fact that nuclear waste would be passing
through common geographic points of reference clearly
commanded attention. Then, on July 15, readers
learned that an accident had befallen the shipment:
“one of about twenty-five yellow, airtight receptacles
dumped into the ocean” had “failed to sink.” It was ac-
tual news this time, and the lengthier report announced
it with alarm: “[a] steel container filled with radioactive
sodium waste is floating somewhere in the Atlantic
Ocean about 185 miles southeast of New York and is a
‘menace to navigation.’” By the following day, July 16,
the incident had also prompted “An Analysis of the
Radioactive Waste Problem and Moves by U.S. to Meet
It.” This record designated the incident to be an illus-
tration for “one of the increasing problems of the nu-
clear age” and argued for “most detailed precautions
[…] to be taken about the disposal of radioactive waste
materials; otherwise careless disposal procedures can be
as damaging to a community as fall-out from a nuclear
weapon.” Despite its even greater length, the record
spent one single sentence to relate that the lost con-
tainer “was […] later found.”
The attention was justified neither by the shipment
nor by the incident itself. It was remarkable for a ship-
ment of just 25 nuclear waste containers of unspecified
weight to be the topic of a report in the New York Times
while uneventfully underway, especially in light of the
fact that, as it would surface in a September 5 record
that scrutinized the operations of a small company dedi-
cated to the dumping of nuclear waste “somewhere at
sea about twenty-seven miles off the Massachusetts
coast,” that one company had carried out more than 500
dumping trips by July 1957 and its capacities allowed for
“more than 200 containers [to] be shipped to sea at a
time.” Moreover, while the incident of the one container
failing to sink was announced with alarm, the lengthiest
of the records related to the topic scattered only three
words to relate that the lost container “was […] later
found.”
The prompt for the extraordinary attention had to be
something else. The sample indicates that it was a feel-
ing of threat. That by 1957, nuclear waste must have
been consensually perceived as threatening was already
indicated in that year’s earliest sampled record. The sole
1957 record to report on the success of yet another ef-
fort to channel nuclear waste into something of use, this
time “a tiny atomic battery” that would power small de-
vices “for almost limitless periods of time,” the January
30 record addressed the safety issue already in its sub-
title: “Device Using Waste of Reactor Is Called Safe as
House Key.”
But while the claim of the successful utilization ap-
pears to have been simply ignored, the safety issue con-
tinued its move towards the very center of public
attention. On March 12, 1957, reporting on “the 1957
nuclear congress, supported by twenty-four scientific
and engineering societies,” the record zoomed in for
“the dangers to the public from the spread of the
atomic energy industry.” Under the subtitle “Engineer
Group Urges Plans by States to Control Wastes in Air
and Streams From Nuclear Industry Plants” this record
set the need for protection from the “long radioactive
life of some of the wastes” into the “hundreds of years.”
This was a considerable augmentation of danger given
that the highest previously cited number of radioactivity
had been 33: a July 1, 1956 science note had explained that
“Cessium has a half-life of thirty-three years, meaning that
in thirty-three years it looses half of its radioactivity.” By
June 5, attention was focused on the “long range plans” of
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration “to safeguard the
country’s future food supply against radioactivity.” Head-
lined “U.S. Combatting Food Radiation,” this record
expressed the certainty of the “threat of radioactivity to
food” in the words of a government official: “‘there is little
doubt that a material amount of radioactivity will spill
over into the farmland and water supplies of this nation.’”
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So the government was already taking action; the record
reported that “large-scale analyses to determine safe radi-
ation tolerances were already under way.”
Whereas the first record of the year 1957 reported on
the search for a beneficial utilization of nuclear waste,
the year’s last record was about a different kind of
technological pursuit: “the feasibility of injecting radio-
active wastes into the ground without contaminating
drinking water or creating other health hazards.” So
1957 can also be seen as a watershed year: the search
for utilization solutions was now the past; the future
would be about protection from danger.
Stage three, definition crystallized
The records from the years 1958 through 1963 imply a
crystallizing if not crystallized public definition of nu-
clear waste. Much of what took place with regard to
nuclear waste between 1958 and 1963, as well as the
ways in which that action was put into words, appear
to spring from an understanding of nuclear waste as a
grave danger.
The coverage of an occurrence in France in October
1960 is illustrative of how widely shared this under-
standing was. On October 11, the first of three consecu-
tive records on the matter introduced the “intention” of
the French Atomic Energy Commission “to sink 6,500
barrels of atomic waste in the sea between Antibes and
Corsica Oct. 20” in terms of an international disagree-
ment: “Prince Rainer III of Monaco wrote to President
de Gaulle today to question the wisdom of a plan to
dump radioactive waste in the Mediterranean.” Then,
the record went on to discuss the dynamics of “several
protests from citizens on the French Riviera” and quoted
one local official as saying “people here are legitimately
alarmed” and as anticipating that “tourists would be
afraid to swim in the Mediterranean.” Minute details of
the grassroots opposition to the dumping within the city
of Nice, as well as an exchange between the city’s mayor
and the head of the French Atomic Energy Commission,
were laid out in a record published on the next day, Oc-
tober 12, 1960. This second record highlighted “a rare
manifestation of political unity” against the dumping:
“Gaullist and Conservative City Councillors joined Com-
munists in threatening to strike if the Government did
not reconsider.” The topic of a third item of coverage
became the fact that the French government did recon-
sider. The record of October 13, 1960 speaks of “victory”
that was “temporary” yet at the same time also “initial.”
This third record used the dismissive tone of the French
atomic governing body to highlight the public under-
standing of nuclear waste as a threat: the agency’s state-
ment was quoted in referring to the anti-dumping
campaigners as “persons who, lacking sufficient informa-
tion, are currently expressing their fears.” The record
concluded by undermining that dismissiveness through
lining the sovereign of Monaco up on the side of the
anti-dumping campaign: “it was learned on good author-
ity that Prince Rainer, now in Paris, has secretly visited
President de Gaulle to express opposition to the dump-
ing project.”
That these public understandings of nuclear waste
would have been shared this side of the Atlantic, is sug-
gested by a record that was published on April 22, 1962.
In reporting the decision of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to deny “a Houston company’s application to dis-
pose of low-level radioactive wastes in the Gulf of
Mexico,” the Associated Press cited an internal “finding”
of the commission as ground for the action: “the grant-
ing of a license to dispose of packaged low-level radio-
active waste in the Gulf of Mexico would have serious
harmful effects on our friendly relations with Mexico.”
The data indicate that this stage of the American pub-
lic’s understanding of nuclear waste was well recognized
by elected representatives. Three records from these years
specifically mention congressional or federal inquiries of
one form of another: on March 18, 1958, upcoming “hear-
ings on the disposal of industrial radioactive wastes” were
reported in the New York Times; on June 28, 1959, readers
learned that four federal agencies had requested a scien-
tific investigation of “the problem of radioactive waste dis-
posal into Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal waters;” by
September 3, 1959, “[a] joint Congressional subcommittee
warned [that existing protection from radioactive waste]
might run out as the peaceful use of the atom was ex-
panded.” To spell out the distinctions between high-level
and low-level nuclear waste, this last record paraphrases
the report presented to the U.S. Congress in explaining
that “[h]igh-level waste could be more than a million
times as dangerous to life and resources as low-level
waste” and that “[h]igh-level waste is so dangerous that
experts have not yet decided whether it would be safe to
cast it 150 miles off shore into 1,000 fathoms of water
(6,000 feet) and leave it there.”
Nuclear waste would have been suspected as a cause
of harm to the degree that incidents involving seemingly
anything nuclear drew attention. An uneventful acciden-
tal leaking of “[a] small amount of radioactive material
[…] from an exhaust stack at Oak Ridge National La-
boratory” became news by the next day; the November
13, 1959 record informed that, despite the absence of
“hazard to the public,” employee cars “were washed, if
necessary, to prevent spread of the material […] in mi-
nute quantities.” “Blasts in Boston Bring Atom Scare”
reads the headline of a record from August 10, 1960 that
reports on “three explosions […] on an open pier about
200 feet from radioactive atomic waste; the fire authority
declared “no fall-out danger” however, and the readers
were additionally assured that “[t]he radioactive material
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on the pier was in thick concrete casks.” A record of
November 16, 1960 that reported the accidental death of
a nuclear scientist at Shirley, Long Island “when a huge
truck loaded with used atomic reactor fuel skidded on
wet pavement and struck his car” must have felt the
need to address the understanding of nuclear waste as
danger already in its subheading: “Car Is Struck by
Truck Full of Radioactive Waste–None Leaks or Spills.”
By this stage of its evolution, public discourse on nu-
clear waste centered on getting rid of it. Whereas only 1
of the 25 records of this timeframe focused on the bene-
ficial utilization of nuclear waste, the disposal theme was
present in each one of the records. Indeed, even that
one December 10, 1961 report on certain buoy “tests on
the use of nuclear waste products as a source of electric
power for lighted aids to [sea] navigation” touched on
disposal in commenting that the tests were part of the
broader search effort “by the A.E.C. for the use of waste
atomic materials [that] are now buried as a rule for
disposal.”
The records overwhelmingly indicate that, in the pub-
lic understanding, the space available for the disposal of
radioactive waste had shrunk significantly. A brief Reu-
ters news of April 9, 1958 reported on governmental ef-
forts at the United Nations for “regulations to prevent
pollution of the high seas or the air above” involved in
radioactive waste disposal. Covering the study of a
“panel of oceanographers” that was “asked to suggest
disposal sites,” a record from June 28, 1959 reported that
“[a]fter intensive study of local oceanographic condi-
tions, the panel selected twenty-eight possible disposal
sites [that included] every major seaport area from Bos-
ton, Mass., to Corpus Christi, Tex.” But on July 14, 1959,
a record reporting on the finding by the National Sci-
ence Foundation that “a fleet of 300 nuclear-powered
ships could safely dispose low-level radioactive wastes in
the oceans ‘without undue hazard to human health’”
concluded with a remark about the suggestion “that
there were about twenty sites in the coastal waters of
the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico that could be used
safely for the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes:”
that suggestion had “drawn strenuous objections from
some of the localities near the proposed dumping
grounds.”
The public sentiment of this stage might have been
best captured in a sentence from a research report
quoted in the New York Times on January 24, 1958:
“[s]afe disposal means that the waste shall not come in
contact with any living thing.”
Stage four, immune to denial
The fourth and last stage of the evolution of the concept
of nuclear waste in the U.S. public discourse is recorded
in the dataset in a relative paucity of items: for all of the
6 years 1964–1969, there were only three records from
the year 1966 and another three from the year 1967 that
fit the study’s sampling criteria; the other 4 years have
no records in the dataset.
Though all six of the sampled records support the
interpretation that the public concept of nuclear
waste, which had already crystallized before 1964, was
now growing immune to denials of danger, only one of
them provides such support explicitly. For all the de-
nials of the dangers of nuclear waste and for all the
shunning of the topic of hazard in the five other re-
cords from this stage, the record of November 2, 1967
documents how the Maltese representative to the
United Nations, one Dr. Arvid Pardo, gravely warned
“that continued indiscriminate dumping of radioactive
waste into the ocean might prevent man from utilizing
the incalculable food and mineral resources of the sea
bottom.”
The other five records support the interpretation indir-
ectly. They do so first of all by documenting the strategies
of an underlying effort to quell what must have been per-
ceived as a prevailing public understanding of nuclear
waste as dangerous. One such strategy was avoidance of
the topic of waste hazards. For example, two records con-
cerning waste reprocessing and ocean dumping overseas,
one from July 8, 1966 involving 13 European countries
and the other from July 30, 1967 involving Japan, steered
completely clear of the topic of danger. And on December
28, 1967, an item of Reuters news marked several months
of delay in informing the readers of the previous summer’s
dumping in “the Eastern Atlantic” of “[e]leven thousand
tons of solid radioactive waste.” This one record also
documented the denial strategy in action: it quoted the
European Nuclear Energy Agency in giving assurance
that the dumping would “represent no risk either to
man or marine organisms.”
Yet the most telling support for the interpretation that
the public conceptualization of nuclear waste was now
growing immune to denials of danger came from the
manner in which such denials were sometimes articu-
lated. A May 23, 1966 record, boldly titled “No Hazard
Found in Atomic Wastes,” opens with the case of one
doctor who “can hardly abide the sight of whitefish, no
matter how nicely prepared” because “for a year he has
eaten a half pound of it every Friday, freshly caught
downstream from the great atomic energy works at Han-
ford, Wash.” The record hypothesizes, “[h]e probably
carries the heaviest body burden of radioactive zinc of
any man in history,” yet “[h]e is not, however, in much
danger. His burden of ‘hot zinc’ is still less than one-
tenth that considered permissible for the general public.”
But if nuclear waste was generally perceived as safe, why
would anyone have needed to go through such an un-
usual symbolic experiment?
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The prompt for this report was an international sym-
posium of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Europe which was then again covered on May 29, 1966.
Not only does the second report recapitulate the case of
the radioactively contaminated yet harmless fish, but it
generalizes that the scientific evidence discussed at the
symposium translated in “almost uniformly good” news:
“[t]here was no evidence that individuals in any part of
the world had ingested enough of the debris to suffer
harm, even by the most conservative health standards.”
And though admitting that “radioactivity seems sinister
to the public” and that “[t]he idea of radioactive waste in
food is alarming,” this record denied the dangers of
radioactivity with some striking sentences: “[e]very day
[… w]ater drawn from the Columbia River to cool the
great reactors at Hanford, Wash., is returned to the river
with more than 60 different kinds of radioactive element.
Those that survive the trip down the river are carried far
out to sea, deposited on the ocean floor, or are picked
up by oysters, clams, mussels and other creatures that
delight the palates of those living in that region. When-
ever residents of Chattanooga, Tenn., take a drink of
water from the municipal supply, they imbibe a little bit
of radioactive waste from Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory, far up the Tennessee and Clinch Rivers.”
If not sarcastic, this bucolic depiction of the delights
of radioactively contaminated victuals indicates at least
that the understanding of nuclear waste as hazard was
pervasive to the degree of prompting one to conceptualize
its entering the human body. That even an explicit denial
of danger cannot but reveal how profoundly the idea of
danger16 was engaged suggests that the evolution of the
concept of nuclear in the public discourse had been
concluded.
Conclusions
It was after 1945 that public discourse in the U.S. wed-
ded the notion of atomic with the notion of litter to de-
note the byproducts of the exploitation of nuclear
reactions for energy production. And it was before
1969 that this new notion of nuclear waste was associ-
ated with devastating consequences to human health
and to the natural environment to a point that, at
present, puts a consensus for disposing of nuclear waste
out of practical reach. When sampled and analyzed
through an adaptation of anthropological methods, this
critical period’s record of the public discourse on nu-
clear waste suggests that the view of nuclear waste
evolved over a number of conceptual stages—from an
initial introduction as a byproduct that was suspected
of potential distant threats, to an assessment of the na-
ture of that threat, to a subsequent crystallization of
the view of nuclear waste as danger, to the present view
of a grave and implacable hazard to human health and
to the natural environment that cannot be entitled to a
physical presence.
In other words, the current public understanding of
nuclear waste neither just appeared out of the blue at a
specific point in time, as it is sometimes assumed, nor
had at its start the same shape in which it is encountered
today. In addition, though the conceptualization of resi-
dues from the exploitation of nuclear reactions took
shape at the same time that the American public grew
aware of the devastation that followed the atomic bomb-
ing in Japan, the data investigated here show that nu-
clear waste was initially viewed as a peacetime concern
and in contrast to military concerns: tellingly, the very
introduction of nuclear waste into public discourse
appealed for public attention in the context of the war
having ended. Finally, though this research cannot dir-
ectly assess the proposition that nuclear fear is rooted
deeply in the human psyche, the data investigated here
show that nuclear waste was not always feared in the
same seemingly implacable way in which it appears to
be feared at present. Instead, to draw a metaphor from
the context of nuclear reactions, it was between the
years 1945 and 1969 that the nucleus of danger in the
public view of nuclear waste exploded, and then, as the
awareness of the hazard that nuclear waste presents to
human health and to the environment mushroomed, the
physical space for disposing of nuclear waste imploded.
Endnotes
1Early in the year 2010, President Obama requested
the formation of a commission “to conduct a comprehen-
sive review of policies for managing the back end of the
nuclear fuel cycle,” known as the Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion on America's Nuclear Future, or BRC. The quotation
is the very heading of the executive summary of the BRC’s
final report [2].
2In its 2012 report, the Blue Ribbon Commission cited
75,000 metric tons as the nation’s then-total inventory
waiting for permanent disposal [2]. According to the Nu-
clear Energy Institute, or NEI, the current inventory of
high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel that are the by-
product of the nuclear energy industry is 71,780 metric
tons [15]. One metric ton is equal to approximately
2200 lb.
3These figures do not include low-level radioactive
waste such as from healthcare and other sources.
4For example, plutonium, a form of transuranic waste,
has a half-life of 24,000 years, meaning that half of the ori-
ginal amount remains radioactive after 24,000 years [16].
5It is stored at well over 100 commercial nuclear re-
actor sites where the waste was generated, including sites
of reactors no longer in operation, as well as at over 200
sites managed by the Department of Energy, or DOE.
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6“[M]any [commercial] nuclear plants have run out
of pool storage capacity,” according to the NEI. “At these
plants, used fuel is stored above ground” [17]. The stor-
age arrangements for what is known as “defense waste”
are described by an observer as “aging tanks larger than
most state capitol domes” some of which “threaten
groundwater and waterways” [18].
7The NEI [19] and the BRC [2] cite the range in
metric tons: 2000 to 2300 metric tons per year.
8There is a need, even before attempting a tax-
onomy of these explanations for the origins of the pub-
lic conceptualization of nuclear waste, to note that the
key concepts driving this research (concepts such as
“public understanding” and even “the public” itself, or
concepts such as “discourse” and “evolution”) are not
universally self-explanatory but demand, as one peer
reviewer put it, conceptual and theoretical clarifica-
tions. Acknowledging that concepts of this order have
long been at the center of debates of a philosophical
nature in sociology, political science, cultural studies,
etc. [20, 21], this present paper does not side with or
dispute any specific theoretical position, nor does it
aim to contribute to such debates. Instead, it uses
“public,” “discourse,” and “public discourse” heuristic-
ally, for the purposes of the research effort outlined.
The author acknowledges that familiarity with the the-
oretical contexts in which such concepts are usually
debated may aid a reader of the paper in better con-
textualizing the empirical and interpretive findings and
conclusions presented here.
9A body of writing exists in anthropology on the
complex legacies of nuclear weapons testing [22].
10Responding to peer review commentary, the au-
thor recognizes that this route is but one of the possible
routes for undertaking this investigation. Indeed, other
methodological perspectives exist, rooted in a range of
scholarly disciplines, that also promise to help illuminate
the important institutional and political forces, as well as
the significant historical events that helped shape the
public conceptualizations of nuclear waste we encounter
in the U.S. at present [23, 24]. Moreover, as this project’s
approach may emphasize “the American perspective,”
perhaps by the very nature of its topical focus, the au-
thor acknowledges that the evolution of the public
conceptualization of nuclear waste, including that within
the U.S. that is the focus of this study, would owe also to
other perspectives that originated and developed outside
of the U.S. In addition, nuclear waste policy and its his-
tory, both within the U.S. and internationally, are sub-
jects of substantial bodies of scholarly writing that
conceptualize nuclear waste from a range of angles, in-
cluding particular sites [25], the siting process as such
[26], comparative international perspectives [27], and
more.
11Pajo J (n.d.) The Two Waves of Public Discourse
on Nuclear Waste in the U.S. since 1945.
12The ways in which a broad range of forces outside
of the media are related to the rise of public conceptuali-
zations may themselves pose questions that may be simply
too numerous and complex to be sufficiently addressed
within the frame of a research paper such as this one.
Responding to peer review commentary, the author ac-
knowledges the importance to this paper’s topic of such
complex relationships between “institutional forces,” “elite
groups,” “military-industrial,” “international actors,” and
others.
13Following the recommendation of one of the jour-
nal’s peer reviewers, the author experimented with broad-
ening this pool of sampling keywords as follows: one
additional search was run in which the keywords “radi-
ation,” “fission,” and “fusion” were searched in combin-
ation with the keyword “waste;” another additional search
was run in which the keywords “pollution,” “emissions,”
and “runoff” were searched instead of the keyword
“waste.” The rationale for this effort was to see whether
the initial sample would be thus augmented substan-
tially. The sample could indeed be augmented, but by a
total of only 12 additional items. These were triggered
as follows: the keyword “pollution” produced seven
additional items, the keyword “radiation” produced four
additional items, and the keyword “emissions” pro-
duced one additional item. The keywords “fission,” “fu-
sion,” and “runoff” did not pull any additional items
from the database. Of the 12 items, two were simply re-
ports of overseas sentiments regarding testing. Reading
all 12 items triggered through this subsequent sampling
effort appeared to support the interpretations presented
in this paper. However, given that these 12 items were
not part of the original sample, they are not discussed
here at length.
14Four of the 77 records that were selected by the
electronic database based on these criteria were later ex-
cluded from the sample due to the fact that, despite con-
taining valid combinations of the selective keywords,
they were topically not about nuclear waste: the keyword
“waste” was in those cases used in its “misspending”
connotation.
15The only exception to the absence of denial of the
harms of nuclear waste during these years lies with one
single record, which was retained in the sample despite
not being directly about nuclear waste. On July 31, 1955,
on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the bombing
of Hiroshima, Robert Trumbull, head of the New York
Times bureau in Tokyo, wrote: “the stories of how the
A-bomb killed the soil, so that plants will not grow in it,
are false. Trees are green wherever they stand, some in
‘ground zero’ of the big blast. If one makes the trip
through a bewildering maze of alleys to where the
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medieval Hiroshima Castle stood in architectural beauty
until the big explosion, the foundations that are left will
be found covered with greenery.” Further on, the article
targeted the human health topic directly: “according to
scientific analyses, the emission of deadly gamma rays
and neutrons in the atomic blast over [Hiroshima caused
much less human damage than the force and heat re-
leased. As for the ‘after-effects’ of radiation, it is calcu-
lated on the basis of careful observation that those who
survive the initial impact of such an explosion have a
pretty good chance of living a normal life thereafter.”
16This nicely illustrates the validity of Mary Douglas’s
classical paradigm of pollution and danger: danger is very
great indeed when such matter-out-of-place as nuclear
waste enters some place where it especially does not be-
long and which especially matters: the human body [28].
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